



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

21/EUR

13 JUN 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DepSecDef Meeting with Turkish Minister of Defense  
Bayulken - 10 June 1981 (U)

(C) DepSecDef met with Turkish Minister of Defense Bayulken in the Pentagon on 10 June 1981. MOD Bayulken made the following points:

- (C) Turkish Military Capabilities: Turkey could not meet its assigned NATO responsibilities because of obsolescent equipment. Even the "Six Year Rolling Procurement Plan" (delivered to Mr. West in Ankara on 22 May) would only provide a force posture and capability below that agreed by NATO as necessary to meet requirements.
- (C) Turkish Air Force Modernization/Advance Fighter Coproduction: TAF had only 78 modern aircraft (F4Es), while potential enemies had far more. TAF would need 30 aircraft per year to meet attrition. Though willing to accept other allies cast-off, obsolescent equipment-- (F-100s, F-104s), this would only be a short term emergency solution. The GOT was committed to modernization and was prepared to make sacrifices. The preferred method was through coproduction, even if Turkish participation was limited to assembly or component manufacture. This effort was over and above that of the "Six Year Rolling Procurement Plan."
- (U) FY 82 Security Assistant Terms: GOT was concerned that although DoD understands Turkey, Congress does not; the Administration needs to "sell" Turkey to Congress by stressing Turkey's strategic location and sacrifices made to meet common defense objectives. The GOT could not afford normal FMS financing because of economic problems, debt burden and might have to forego acceptance of help under House conditions (one quarter grant, three quarters normal direct FMS credits in lieu of \$250M concessionary direct credits plus \$150M indirect) for FY 82. The Administration should make a strong fight to pass Senate version of concessionary direct credit substitution (one half debt forgiveness, one half normal FMS credits).

OSD review completed

Classified by: Dir, EUR & NATO Affairs  
Declassify by: 16 June 1987

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- (C) Southwest Asia: GOT agreed about the threat, but questioned US view of what to do about it. GOT believed that a strong Turkey, equipped for modern warfare, and closely allied with the US could also be of political and military assistance in defense of the Gulf area. No one could criticize Turkey for taking steps to increase its capabilities to defend itself against the Soviet threat.
- (C) Terrorist Threat: The GOT saw a "Satanic power" behind the political terror directed against Turkey and the attempt to create a "groundswell to force Turkey to leave NATO." GOT was making a successful fight against terrorism, and would continue to fight it while moving toward a resumption of democratic party politics. GOT would maintain the NATO commitment.

(C) Significant points made by the US side were:

- (C) Administration would first argue for return of direct credits at concessionary rates; fall back to Senate 50/50 version.
- (C) We would meet with GOT officials in the future to help determine priorities for funding. We could not commit to a specific figure or increase in assistance in the near term, but we had high hopes for the out years and would make a maximum effort.
- (C) We needed to work on cooperative things to help sway Congress: NATO COB program, more combined exercises, more exchanges at the staff level and more intelligence sharing.



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